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Abstract
Investments in the extension of health insurance coverage, the strengthening of public health services, as 
well as primary care and better hospitals, highlights the emerging role of healthcare as part of China’s new 
growth regime, based on an expansion of services, and redistributive policies. Such investments, apart from 
their central role in terms of relief for low-income people, serve to rebalance the Chinese economy away 
from export-led growth toward the domestic market, particularly in megacity-regions as Shanghai and 
the Pearl River Delta, which confront the challenge of integrating migrant workers. Based on the paper by 
Gusmano and colleagues, one would expect improvements in population health for permanent residents of 
China’s cities. The challenge ahead, however, is how to address the growth of inequalities in income, wealth 
and the social wage. 
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Gusmano and colleagues (1) have written an important paper that highlights the expanding role of healthcare and its probable effects in contributing to population 
health improvements in Shanghai. What they do not include 
in their analysis, however, is any political-economic context 
in which to understand why the example of cities like 
Shanghai may be forerunners of what we may expect in 
China’s exploding cities. Therefore, I propose to present this 
perspective in my commentary.
In 2010, China became the world’s largest manufacturing 
nation (19.8% of the world’s manufacturing output) 
bypassing the US (19.4%), thus ending its 110 year-run as 
the largest producer of goods (2). After joining the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China’s growth during 
its golden period (2002–7) was driven mainly by fixed asset 
investments and exports, whose average annual growth rates 
were respectively 29% and 24%. Following the spread of the 
US financial crisis around the world, the fall of global demand 
revealed China’s high export dependency. Meanwhile, 
the government’s stimulus package (2009–10), based on 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to maintain 
economic growth, raised the investment rate to 48% of GDP 
for four consecutive years (2009–12), leading to overcapacity 
in certain sectors, a decline in efficiency, inflation and 
wage pressures (3). 
In order to temper the effects of productivity declines 
and reductions in exports since 2010, China has moved 
from investment and export-led growth based on low 
wage labor towards a new type of slower growth based on 
research and development (R&D), indigenous innovation 
and the domestic market. Today the priority sectors are 
transportation (high-speed trains, subways, aircraft), renewable 
energy, and the cutting-edge sectors of R&D (ICT’s, life 
sciences, nanotechnologies, space exploration). In addition, 
overcapacities in real estate and manufacturing require a 
decline of investment in these sectors while expanding and 
restructuring services will be important to sustaining GDP 
and net employment growth in the medium-term (4). China’s 
health expenditures are much lower, in terms of GDP, than 
the average for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) nations.
Under these circumstances the reform of public health, the 
extension of health insurance coverage and the improvement 
of healthcare services is an important factor for correcting 
inequalities and rebalancing growth toward the domestic 
market, particularly in megacity-regions such as Shanghai 
and the Pearl River Delta, which confront the challenge of 
integrating migrant workers.
China’s investment and export-led growth, was largely 
dependent on the supply of cheap labor from the hinterland, 
in a context of stunted urbanization resulting from the Maoist 
policies (1949 to 1979). This compelling illustration of 
Arthur Lewis’ development model (5), whereby the transfer 
of an unlimited supply of labor in traditional sectors feeds 
accumulation in modern sectors through the urbanization 
process, has now been challenged for several reasons and 
that is why we can expect to see the growth of internal 
investments, including those in the health sector, whose 
effects the paper by Gusmano and colleagues (1) attempts to 
assess. To understand the strength and importance of China’s 
new strategy for economic development, it is important to 
understand why China’s high investment and export-led 
Fabre
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2015, 4(3), 195–197196
growth model is no longer sustainable.
First, as early as 2004–7 there was a labor shortage in the 
Pearl River Delta Region of Guangdong province due partly 
to the absence of any social insurance for the massive migrant 
population (6). This region, concentrated between Canton, 
Shenzhen and Zhuhai, the two special economic zones at 
the borders of Hong Kong and Macao, accounts for some 
30% of foreign investment and exports, and 10% of GDP 
(7). Although the labor shortage often took the form of high 
turnover rates, and an imbalance of female employment, this 
trend is likely to increase in the future. United Nations  (UN) 
projections indicate that in the 20 years from 2010 to 2030, 
the pool of 15 to 23 years olds, which provides the bulk of 
labor-intensive activities, will fall, as a result of the one-child 
policy, by almost 60 million people to a total of 164 million 
from 202 to 142 million (8).
Second, from 1998 to 2010 China has seen a moderate growth 
of real wages exceeding the real GDP growth rate by an order 
of 1% (9). But the rise of real wages has been dramatic since 
the new decade with the multiplication of labor conflicts in 
2010, the second year of the stimulus package following the 
global crisis. According to a study by the Research Office 
of the China State Council, in 2006 the migrants from the 
countryside worked an average of 11 hours a day, 6 or 7 days 
a week, or nearly 50% more than permanent residents, but 
received only 60% of the pay, without counting the difference 
in social protection (10). According to the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, 27/05/2013 (in Chinese), of a total of 
262 million migrants, 163 are trans-provincial migrants, and 
99 million are intra-provincial migrants. In 2012, the average 
salary for the 163 million trans-provincial migrants reached 
2290 RMB (375 US dollars) (11). Some local economists 
underline China’s loss of competitiveness for labor-intensive 
goods: according to the Ministry of Commerce, China’s urban 
workers’ salaries rose at an average of 33% from 2009 to 2011, 
and minimum salaries rose in 2010 and 2011 at an average of 
20% in most of the provinces (12). These higher wages benefit 
mainly about half of the 260 million migrant workers born 
after 1980, who are better-educated, with an average of about 
ten years in school. They are, therefore, more demanding than 
their parents and more familiar with the internet and new 
technologies (13). 
Third, since 2000, the cost of land has risen at high rates every 
year, and even more so after the 2008 crisis, when it was used 
to finance the local part of the stimulus package, which led 
to a predictable property bubble, in the absence of any land 
tax. If we add the competitiveness loss due to the reevaluation 
of the Renminbi to the US dollar, combined with inflation 
pressures, it is clear that China’s high investment and export-
led growth model is no longer sustainable.  
This triple shock in terms of costs-affecting exchange 
rates, labor, and land – has increased the importance of 
China’s R&D and innovation policy as the main strategy for 
ascending the value chain, as Japan and the four dragons 
had previously done in the mid-1980s. R&D and innovation 
matter: the US Department of Commerce estimates that 75% 
of the growth in the American economy since World War 
II is due to technological innovation (14). In the context of 
China’s current restructuration towards services, which is 
also an economic priority, investments in the health sector 
will become significant areas for growth, and based on the 
paper by Gusmano and colleagues (1), one might also expect 
improvements in population health. There is, however, an 
important challenge ahead – one not lost on the authors of 
this paper.
The challenge ahead concerns the growth of inequalities 
in income, wealth and the social wage. The dynamics of 
Chinese urbanisation, which took off since the mid-eighties, 
have created a social divide within cities between citizens of 
urban origin (Hukou) having access to social security, public 
housing and education , and migrants (Mingong) or second-
tier citizens who have migrated from rural areas and are 
a priori denied such rights (15). The numbers of migrants, 
whose specific circumstances vary, are estimated at more than 
a third of the population of Beijing, Shanghai and the Pearl 
River Delta in Guangdong province (16). Although the urban 
population is estimated at 52% of the total population, only 
35% of the total benefit from the urban status “Hukou”. 
It is clear that the new policies decided by the third Plenum 
of the Central Committee in November 2013 aim to create an 
inclusive growth, a transition from the investment and export-
led growth of “cheap China” to a new redistributive model, 
where the health system, along with other services such as 
education will have to include the real and not the nominal 
urban population. The National Urbanization Blueprint for 
2014-20 has set a target of 60% of urban population while 
45% of population would have access to urban “Hukou”. 
This means extending social benefits such as education and 
health services to more than 100 million people (17). The new 
urbanization policy (18) is thus tightly linked to the health 
reform and investments. 
The challenge, however, lies in implementing these goals in 
public health and social improvements which are far more 
complicated than building physical infrastructure. Indeed, it 
will be important to continue tracking the impact of efforts by 
municipal and provincial governments, hospitals, physicians, 
pharmaceuticals and other stakeholders, as they negotiate the 
implementation of what is surely the most ambitious attempt, 
worldwide, to provide universal healthcare coverage to a 
national population of over 1.3 billion. 
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